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Chapter 2: The Stasi’s Reporting on the Federal Republic of Germany∗ 
By Paul Maddrell 
˂A˃Introduction: Department VII and its reports 
This chapter examines the reports to its political leadership of the German Democratic 
Republic (GDR)’s foreign intelligence service on the main subversive threat to the 
GDR: the Federal Republic of Germany. The GDR’s main foreign intelligence service 
was the Main Intelligence Directorate (Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung, or HVA) of the 
notorious Ministry of State Security (Ministerium für Staatssicherheit, or Stasi). The 
HVA’s reports to the leadership of the ruling Communist Party, the Socialist Unity 
Party (Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands, or SED) were prepared by its 
Department VII (Abteilung VII). The SED’s leaders received these reports 
(Parteiinformationen) daily. No copies survive in the Party’s archive, held in Berlin 
by the Stiftung Archiv der Parteien und Massenorganisationen der DDR (SAPMO-
BA), because the recipients were instructed, in the interest of secrecy, to return each 
report. Their copies were then destroyed; the only copy which was meant to survive 
was that of the HVA itself. The HVA’s archive was destroyed in 1990. However, 
some 60% of the Parteiinformationen have survived because the HVA was proud of 
its reporting and wanted to preserve it for posterity.1 That the party archive holds so 
little on the leadership’s relations with the security and intelligence services means 
that too little is known about how the SED’s leaders reacted to the intelligence they 
received.  
Department VII’s principal subject was West Germany. This was so because 
the GDR’s relationship with the Federal Republic was far and away its most 
important. Whatever their public pronouncements, the SED’s leaders always realized 
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that East Germans remained part of a larger German nation. Events in West Germany 
affected the stability and success of the GDR. Any success for West Germany, in their 
eyes, menaced the GDR; any turn for the worse represented an opportunity. Ideology 
increased the subversive threat which the Federal Republic was considered to be. 
Since the SED insisted that the creation of a Communist society had eliminated the 
basis for any opposition in the GDR, it followed that any opposition or instability had 
to result from the malice of the capitalist West and first and foremost the Federal 
Republic. The Communist leaders were acutely sensitive to developments in West 
Germany. Any activities of the West German trades union movement which might 
appeal to East German industrial workers were alarming; the German Association of 
Trades Unions (Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund, or DGB) was accordingly closely 
monitored by the HVA.2 The SED’s concern extended to events in West Germany far 
removed from politics. The HVA monitored carefully the Federal Republic’s 
preparations for the Olympic Games of 1972 (held in Munich), fearing that it might 
add to the country’s prestige.3 Young West Germans’ growing hostility to serving in 
the Federal armed forces, the Bundeswehr, and their increasingly poor discipline as 
soldiers were noted.4  
This chapter is based on Department VII’s reports from four periods in the life 
of the GDR. The first is the period 1959-1961 when the GDR was caught up in the 
Second Berlin Crisis, which culminated in the closure of the Berlin sectoral border. 
During these years, the HVA kept Ulbricht and other top leaders supplied with a 
constant stream of intelligence on the Berlin Question and particularly on West 
German views of it. The second is 1972, when the GDR was reluctantly embracing 
détente. The third is 1983, when military developments made the international 
situation seem threatening; the SED was troubled by the deployment of medium- and 
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intermediate-range nuclear missiles in West Germany and other member states of the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). The HVA was also then involved in the 
KGB’s global operation to obtain warning of a nuclear first strike by NATO (the 
operation was codenamed “RYaN”). The fourth is the GDR’s final crisis of 1989. In 
all these periods the HVA was obtaining much intelligence on the Federal Republic 
and was reporting on it to the leaderships of the Party, the armed forces and the Stasi, 
as well as the leaderships of other Bloc states.  
In 1989 Department VII consisted of six analytical staffs, of which one was 
concerned exclusively with the Federal Republic.5 The Department was very well-
supplied with intelligence on West Germany. Over thirty years, the HVA built up a 
formidable capability to obtain information from within the West German 
government, political parties, labor movement, armed forces, media, and industrial 
and scientific communities. Department VII prepared reports on political, economic 
and military matters.6 Its reports are on a full range of subjects: West German party 
politics; foreign and defense policy; the Federal Republic’s relations with its major 
allies and other states; developments in NATO; NATO’s weaponry and forces in 
West Germany; other military matters; the West German labor movement; industry7; 
Western European Socialist parties and politics; international economic decision-
making in which West Germany was involved; West German views of developments 
in the GDR and Bloc; and more besides.  
A point which arises clearly from the reports is that the intelligence the HVA 
obtained from within the West German government, political parties and companies 
was also its main source of information on the wider world. It reported on what West 
Germany’s politicians, civil servants and soldiers thought of events elsewhere. This 
became easier and easier as the Federal Republic increasingly became integrated into 
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multilateral Western structures, chief among them NATO, the European Economic 
Community (EEC), the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank 
(WB). This integration enabled the HVA to spy on the Federal Republic’s Western 
allies.8 As the Federal Republic, from the late 1960s, entered into relations with the 
Eastern European states, the HVA was able to provide the SED leaders with 
information on the thinking and dealings of their Communist comrades.9 Its 
intelligence reporting was that of a parasite.  
One person appears more often in these reports than any other: Willy Brandt. 
Brandt’s dismal lot was that his rise in West German and European politics moved in 
step with the HVA’s penetration of West German political life. Only in the late 1950s 
did the HVA begin to enjoy substantial success in recruiting sources in West German 
political parties. Its success was greatest in the West Berlin Social Democratic Party 
(Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands, or SPD), of which Brandt was chairman. 
So the HVA obtained much information on him. It had increasing success in the 
1960s in penetrating the West German government; Brandt, of course, became 
Foreign Minister in 1966 and Chancellor in 1969. At his side when he was Chancellor 
was an HVA spy, Günter Guillaume, whom Brandt took with him on trips around the 
world (some of the reports of Department VII are said to come from a “travelling 
companion” (Reisebegleiter) of Brandt10). Karl Wienand, the SPD chief whip in the 
Bundestag, was another top-level HVA source who reported on Brandt. Brandt 
resigned as Chancellor in 1974, when Guillaume was exposed, but remained 
Chairman of the SPD, in which the HVA still had valuable sources. He also played a 
prominent role in Western European Socialist politics, in which the HVA took a close 
interest, and in international affairs, on which Department VII also reported fully. 
Brandt must have been one of the most spied-on Germans in history. The HVA 
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followed him wherever he went. As far as West Berlin SPD politics in the late 1950s 
and early 1960s are concerned, the HVA quite literally followed him from meeting to 
meeting. 
 
˂A˃The conventions which governed the HVA’s reporting 
Throughout the period under consideration, strict conventions governed the Stasi’s 
intelligence reporting, including that of the HVA. These conventions were established 
in the 1950s and affected the Stasi’s reporting on both domestic and foreign subjects. 
They were imposed by Erich Mielke, who was made Minister of State Security in 
1957 by the SED’s First Secretary Walter Ulbricht. Ulbricht was then concerned 
about the Stasi’s reporting. In his view, it contained too much criticism. These 
conventions concerned both the content and the style of the reports. Reports on 
foreign subjects, though prepared by the HVA, went first to the Ministry’s principal 
intelligence assessment body, the ZAIG (Zentrale Auswertungs- und 
Informationsgruppe), which forwarded them on to the leadership. The ZAIG also 
prepared reports on domestic subjects, using information provided by the Stasi’s 
domestic security departments.11 
Intelligence reports could not criticize the regime or its policies or dispute the 
SED’s legitimacy or whether it genuinely represented public opinion. If intelligence 
reports were too critical, they would undermine the Party’s legitimacy by implying 
that the Party line was wrong or unpopular and that Marxism-Leninism was not as 
“scientific” as it claimed to be. Throughout the period 1959-89 most (72%) of the 
intelligence reporting to the Party leadership concerned foreign rather than domestic 
subjects and came from the HVA. This was so even though more of the Ministry’s 
intelligence collection took place within the GDR than outside it. This reflects how 
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sensitive reporting on the GDR was. It inevitably raised difficult questions of 
legitimacy, popular representation and political stability.12 An illusory justification 
was given for this practice. By the 1970s the Party line on détente was that the Soviet 
Bloc’s strength had forced the West into a policy of accommodation. The corollary of 
this was that the GDR had achieved an unprecedented degree of stability. This meant 
that there was little need to report on the political situation at home.  
The Department’s staff took care not to criticize the Party’s outlook. Reports 
which might displease their readers were retained within the Ministry. They can still 
be found in the archive, marked “nicht rausgegangen” (not gone out). Rather, they 
saw their job as to give the Party opportunities for action by informing it of 
opportunities and threats. They are better described as reporters or newsmen than 
analysts. Reading their reports, one cannot help but be reminded of journalists, who 
summarize information and pass on the news quickly. This is different from the work 
of an analyst, who tries to pass on understanding rather than news. Journalists also 
know well what news their readers expect.  
A further convention was that Department VII’s staff did not report on 
whatever they wanted to. They only reported on subjects of interest to the Party. In 
the early 1970s the HVA’s political intelligence reporting chiefly concerned three 
subjects: the Federal Republic’s policy towards the GDR; political developments in 
West Germany; and the attitude of other states, mainly in the Third World, to the 
diplomatic recognition of the GDR. The reports did not deal comprehensively with 
any particular topic; instead, they were short and concentrated on conveying 
information to the readers.13  
The readership was not fixed. It was not the case that all Politburo members or 
all Central Committee secretaries received them. They were sent to a small and ever-
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changing group of Party leaders (sometimes only a handful and never more than about 
twenty in number). Most were members of the Politburo. Most HVA reports also 
went to the KGB. The content of the report determined who received it. Political 
intelligence was sent to the top Party leaders. Military intelligence reports 
(approximately 30% of the HVA’s output) were sent to the Defense Minister and 
leading military commanders, not the top Party figures. Economic and commercial 
information was sent to the leading economic officials. In the 1970s and 1980s, the 
principal recipient was Günter Mittag, the Central Committee Secretary responsible 
for the GDR’s economy.  
Strict conventions also applied to the use of the intelligence. No recipient 
knew who else had received the same report (unless one went to the General 
Secretary, in which case he was informed who the other recipients were). The 
information contained in the report could not be discussed, even in Politburo 
meetings. This must have greatly limited its value in decision-making, as did the fact 
that some members had received the information while others had not. Its influence is 
certainly hard to discern since, naturally, the minutes of Politburo meetings do not 
record members referring to it.14  
The ZAIG’s reporting to the political leadership on domestic matters was also 
selective. It reported on particular topics, usually troublesome problems, individuals 
or social groups (like the churches or the young). Often the reason for the report was 
that the Western media had already taken the issue up; the Stasi provided the leaders 
with an official GDR view of the matter and prepared them to respond. Because it 
raised sensitive questions of popular representation and legitimacy, the ZAIG’s 
reporting on public opinion in the GDR was relatively rare. It tended to concern 
particular groups in society rather than East German public opinion as a whole. The 
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reports tended to present the situation positively. Reports making particularly 
sensitive findings were retained within the Stasi.15 
 
˂A˃Department VII’s reporting 
How did these conventions affect the HVA’s intelligence reporting? The Party’s 
claim to infallibility was a heavy burden on the entire Ministry. In the 1950s, the 
Stasi’s reporting of foreign intelligence was crude. The best example of how crude it 
could be comes, not from the records of the HVA’s Department VII, but from those of 
the Ministry’s main assessment body in the late 1950s, the Information Department 
(Abteilung Information). In 1957, the Party leadership was so alarmed at this 
department’s reporting on public criticism of the regime that it required the Stasi 
strictly to restrict the dissemination of its reports, which it regarded as so subversive 
that they might undermine the loyalty even of Stasi officers. The Party leadership 
introduced strict rules of its own regarding the dissemination of the HVA’s 
intelligence reports.16  
The Information Department did try to prepare actual assessments: that is to 
say, information from various sources was combined to form a view of a particular 
problem beyond the GDR’s borders which was of interest to the leadership. A report 
which has survived is an assessment from March 1959 of the impact on the West 
Berlin population of the visit of the First Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party, 
Nikita Khrushchev, to East Berlin. Although the Information Department’s staff acted 
as assessors rather than newsmen, they were still not analysts in the Western sense. 
They did not try to reach conclusions of their own. Their approach to studying the 
matter was politically correct; so were their main findings, although they did not 
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entirely disregard the information available to them. They were careful in how they 
examined the matter, what they wrote and how they arranged it.  
Since they were reporting to the party leadership, the view of the situation 
they presented was very much that which it wanted to see. They were also strongly 
influenced by the fact that Khrushchev was visiting the GDR to reinforce his 
ultimatum to the Western Allies over Berlin. They were therefore commenting on a 
matter on which both the Soviet Communist Party and their own had clear, aggressive 
policies. They knew that their job was to uphold the Party’s rule and authority; they 
believed that the Party was always right. Consequently, they did not intend to tell it 
what to think. Khrushchev, as the supreme representative of the mother party of 
Communism, was a figure worthy of special respect.  
The report crudely distorts the view of the West Berlin population about 
Khrushchev’s visit. In so doing, it reflects the SED’s policy on the Berlin Question 
and the basic ideas of Marxism-Leninism. Political viewpoints are tied to social class 
(Uta Stolle has called this “social class theater”).17 Each social class is presented as 
holding the view Marxism-Leninism required that it should. Above all, the SED 
regime’s standpoint is presented as attractive to the working class in West Berlin and 
utterly convincing for workers in East Germany. Opposition in East Germany is 
presented as small and confined to marginal social groups.  
The visit is presented as a success with the West Berlin population (and 
chiefly with the workers and employees among them). These people had approved of 
what Khrushchev had said and how he had acted. Individuals are quoted expressing 
positive views; these views are said to represent those of a large part of the West 
Berlin workforce. This “positive reaction” came close to reflecting the SED’s own 
policy on the German Question; the report speaks of their condemnation of the 
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distorted reporting of the West Berlin press on the issue and their view that there was 
a “need to normalize the status of West Berlin.” 
The reaction of the West Berlin population is examined by social category. 
Bank employees are said to want to do business with the GDR, not wage war on the 
Soviet Bloc. Employees in administrative offices (Verwaltungsangestellten) are said 
to be troubled by Khrushchev’s visit because it showed his determination over West 
Berlin, which would force the Western Allies to leave it. Consequently, these people, 
like business and professional people, are stated to be considering moving to West 
Germany. The West Berlin middle class is reported to believe that the best solution to 
the Berlin Question was that it should become a free city (Khrushchev’s policy). 
American army officers and soldiers are stated to be troubled by the visit, fearing that 
it was a sign of worse to come. All classes of the West Berlin population are 
presented as thinking well of Khrushchev’s speeches. 
“Negative arguments” (“negative Argumente”) are referred to in the report. 
However, they come in a short section at the end. They are also stated to be either 
merely the views of particular individuals or are simply listed as quotations which are 
not attributed to any person or social group. An indication of how widely these views 
were held is missing from the report. In sum, the report was “intelligence to please.” 
It represented disinformation.18 
The Stasi’s reporting on the reaction of East Germans to Khrushchev’s visit 
was even more politically correct. It was not only crudely distorted but tended 
towards hyperbole. East Germans, and above all the working class, were stated to be 
in “joyful agreement” with Khrushchev. The views of the working class were said to 
be entirely in accord with the official line of the SED and with the public statements 
of Khrushchev and Ulbricht on the German Question. East Germans were also said to 
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like Khrushchev and his conduct. Many expressions of opinion are listed in the report. 
Not all were supportive of the regime’s propaganda, but the report treats these 
viewpoints as unacceptable deviations from a satisfactory norm. It refers to them as 
“Unklarheiten” (“uncertainties,” which in Communist language meant confused 
thinking). Hostile viewpoints are also reported but they are said to be very few in 
number and heavily outnumbered by supportive ones.19 
The reporting of Department VII of the HVA was never so crude. It did not so 
slavishly reproduce the regime’s propaganda. However, throughout the years 1959-89 
its reporting had severe weaknesses. The reporters tried not to antagonize their 
readers. Their principal concession to them was to write reports which were very 
factual in character. They passed on information rather than an analysis. The problem 
with an analysis was that it might give the Party leaders the impression that the 
intelligence service wanted to take decisions for them. The reporters did not try to 
reach any conclusions which added substantially to the information they were 
reporting. Still less did they try to reach conclusions independent of the Party’s 
thinking. They saw their task as to summarize the information available to them.20 In 
the 1950s, they generally summarized reports obtained from a single source and the 
source’s codename appears at the end of the report. By the 1970s they were 
increasingly blending the information available to them from more than one source. 
The Department’s reports avoided prediction and concentrated on stating what was 
taking place or being planned at the time. In American terminology, they represented 
“current intelligence.” Predictions were dangerous because they might contradict the 
wishful thinking of the leadership. It was safer to report on what was happening, 
being planned or had happened. The reporters did not recommend any course of 
action. Consequently, the HVA had no view of the Federal Republic which was 
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independent of that of the SED leadership. That view was generated by Marxism-
Leninism. 
Of course, it is not possible to summarize information without making 
judgements and Department VII did make them. However, they are better described 
as sub-judgements: judgements necessary to make sense of, and organize, the 
information they had received and were passing on. Some of these sub-judgements 
were important and stirred up controversy.  
Another way of deferring to the leadership was to pass on to it the kind of 
information it wanted. Department VII’s staff consistently passed on information 
which supported the leaders’ delusion that all opposition in the GDR was inspired and 
directed by forces in the West. Only as the regime moved into its final crisis did this 
change.21 The Department’s reports also reflect an avid interest on the part of the SED 
leadership in the activities of the political Left (in all its forms) in West Germany, 
Western Europe and elsewhere. Even though the SPD was not in power in West 
Germany in the years between 1949 and 1966, the HVA seems to have sent the party 
leadership more reports on it than on the conservative parties, the CDU/CSU and 
FDP. In part, of course, this reflected the sources available to it. However, in part it 
also reflected the SED leadership’s very high opinion of the political importance of 
the Left everywhere. The Left was the agent of history.  
The department’s reporting was also tailored to the interests of particular 
consumers. Walter Ulbricht seems to have been particularly interested in the doings of 
the West German trades union movement. Reports on it were sometimes sent to him 
post-haste, by special courier.22 Ulbricht feared the influence on East German workers 
of West German trades unionists, led by the DGB. He never forgot the shock of the 
workers’ uprising of June 1953. True believer in Communism that he was, he feared 
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that West German influence was luring the workers away from Communism. He was 
also on the watch for signs that the West German working class was turning towards 
Communism; it never did. The SED’s leaders were also very interested in intelligence 
on the thoughts, plans and disputes of the West German SPD and on the activities of 
young Socialists in the Federal Republic. In 1959 Ulbricht and other top leaders 
received reports on discussions within the SPD every few days. Sometimes they 
received more than one report a day.23 Even at the very end of the Cold War, the SED 
was still using the HVA to monitor the SPD and its electoral performance.24 
Department VII’s concessions affected the phrasing of its reports as well. If 
the report was on a subject on which the Party had a definite policy, the report might 
make clear that the reporters respected that policy.25 The reports frequently concerned 
people who were fiercely critical of the SED and GDR; this criticism was toned 
down. Politically incorrect terms, like “the freedom of Berlin” and “consistent 
violation of human rights” (by the GDR) are often put in inverted commas.26 A very 
good example is a report from 1972 on ethnic Germans living in states of the Soviet 
Bloc who wanted to migrate to the Federal Republic. This was a very sensitive matter 
since only a small proportion of the Germans wanted to migrate to the GDR. The 
report glosses over this with the words, “For various reasons their hopes for achieving 
resettlement have always chiefly focused on the Federal Republic and on a 
significantly smaller scale on the GDR.”27 The General Secretary received a little 
flattery; the reporters wanted to make clear that they respected him.28 
One category of report seems to be less factual than the others. They are 
reports on economic developments in the capitalist world, particularly on the West 
German economy. They were sent to top party leaders throughout the four periods 
with which this paper is concerned.29 The reports are distorted by a Marxist-Leninist 
Copyright 2015 by Georgetown University Press. Maddrell, P. The Image of the Enemy: Intelligence 
Analysis of Adversaries since 1945. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press
127 
 
understanding of economics. This flaw was not confined to intelligence reports, of 
course. It is equally visible in public pronouncements of the regime and in the GDR 
press. The distortion is present in all four periods examined, though it is slight by the 
1970s. Slight, of course, does not mean uninfluential: the reports’ readers were such 
diehard Marxists that they probably seized on this kind of information.  
The distortion is evident in the late 1950s. A report from March 1959 about 
West German Economics Minister Ludwig Erhard’s tour of East Asia maintains that 
the tour resulted from pressure from West German monopolies which were troubled 
by sales difficulties and wanted to open up new markets. This report was sent to top 
leaders, including Ulbricht.30 Only three months later Ulbricht received a report on 
economic differences between the United States and Canada; the authors clearly 
started from the Marxist premise that the struggle for markets was an inherent flaw in 
capitalism.31  
Reports from 1972 on the prognoses of West Germany’s Federal Association 
of German Industry (Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie) for the economy 
display the same flaw. The reports state that these prognoses were very pessimistic. 
There undoubtedly was bad economic news at the time and pessimistic forecasts were 
made. However, nowhere in the reports do the strength of the West German economy 
and its weight in the international economy appear. A key feature of the Department’s 
reporting on economic matters is what it does not say. The same bias is evident in a 
report from 1972 on West German thinking about international currency reform 
following the collapse of the Bretton Woods system the previous year. It is implicit 
throughout the report that the dollar had been very successful as the international 
economy’s linchpin currency; its success points to a highly successful international 
capitalist economy, but nowhere is this expressly stated.32 The oil shock of the early 
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1970s must have greatly encouraged the Marxist-Leninists in the SED Politburo to 
believe that the capitalist economy was in severe and damaging crisis.33 Some 
expressions in these reports smack of a Marxist understanding of economics rather 
than the thinking of West German industrialists. One report claims that, “aggressive, 
vagabond dollars are lying in wait so as to bring down the German currency 
market.”34 By contrast, a report in 1972 to Erich Honecker, Horst Sindermann (the 
then Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers) and other leaders on West 
German analyses of the performance of the GDR’s economy is very superficial and 
tedious; it may be that the reporters were unwilling to make the leadership aware of 
the full contents of the West German analyses.35 
Another aspect of the economic reporting of the HVA is worthy of note. It 
reported to top leaders on very unimportant matters. This was not actually specific to 
its economic reporting; top leaders received reports on all sorts of trivial matters. 
However, the triviality of the economic reports seems to be influenced by Marxist 
ideas of cutthroat capitalist competition. For instance, in February 1972 Hermann 
Axen and others received a report on the competition between West Germany and 
France over making the color television system each preferred (PAL in the Federal 
Republic’s case, SECAM in France’s case) the more popular in the Mediterranean 
area. It is hard to see why the HVA would be reporting to such senior figures in the 
regime on such unimportant and technical matters unless the information pandered to 
their Marxist delusion that market competition would undermine the close relations 
the two partner-states had established.36 
The tendency to let Marxist economics infuse reports on the Western 
economies quickly became weaker than Department VII’s usual matter-of-fact 
approach. Certainly by the early 1970s, the reporting had become almost entirely 
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factual. It may be that the HVA had become so used to reporting on the workings of 
the capitalist economy that the influence of Marxism on them had declined. Its 
officers were also abler and better-educated than they had been previously.37 Its 
reporting avoids crude Marxist errors, such as a tendency to consider capitalist states 
similar because they are all capitalist. A report from 1983 about Western sanctions on 
trade with the Soviet Bloc differentiates accurately between Western European and 
American attitudes to them. It distinguishes between the moderate Western European 
policy on sanctions and the more extreme American policy. It maintains that, in the 
United States, the Reagan Administration’s policy was to reduce trade with the Soviet 
Bloc so as to diminish the resources available to the Soviet military-industrial 
complex, while Western European governments wanted to increase trade so as to 
enhance opportunities for exercising influence. It also states that the foundation of the 
Western European view was that the free world’s economies were clearly superior in 
many respects to those of the Bloc--so superior that greater East-West trade could not 
undermine this superiority. Both the Western Europeans and the Americans believed 
that the Soviet economy suffered from severe weaknesses which could be exploited. 
The Reagan Administration believed that these weaknesses were so great that the 
USSR could be forced into undertaking economic and social reforms. The report is 
clearly based on reports obtained in Western capitals and NATO; facts triumphed 
over Marxist economics.38 
This was just as much the case at the very end of the GDR’s life. A report 
from 1989, about discussions between member states of the International Monetary 
Fund and World Bank, reads like a minute of their discussions--so much so that it is 
odd to find it in a Communist archive.39 Another, from September 1989, concerns the 
US Government’s thinking about the economic potential of the Asian-Pacific region. 
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The information contained in the report seems to have been obtained chiefly from the 
National Security Council (NSC). The United States was very impressed by the 
region’s economic potential and feared its competitive challenge. It planned to 
prepare itself for a “Pacific Century.” The report is a well-informed survey of US 
foreign economic policy, very free of ideological language or assumptions. This is 
remarkable since it was addressed to the top leaders of the Party, including Honecker 
(the Party’s General Secretary), Stoph (the Chairman of the Council of Ministers) and 
Axen (a Politburo member and the Central Committee Secretary responsible for 
international relations). Its description of US policy has turned out to be very 
accurate. The US did indeed use the crisis of the Communist Bloc to reduce the 
military threat to Western Europe from the Warsaw Pact and turn NATO from a 
military alliance into a political one. The US did plan to use the resources released by 
this to prepare itself for the Asian-Pacific challenge.40 
In 1989 the HVA summarized an analysis by a West German economic 
research institute on the Comecon states’ policies on manufacturing and trading in 
high technology goods. The HVA was at its most matter-of-fact when summarizing 
reports obtained in the West; its summary was an accurate one, uninfluenced by 
ideology. The report contained many statements which must have made its readers 
swallow hard: that the Comecon states were imitators but that trends in high 
technology indicated that the costs of imitation were rising faster than the costs of 
innovation; that the GDR had rested its entire economic policy on achieving the world 
standard in electronics and yet in microprocessors and silicon chips it was at least a 
generation behind; and that the states of the Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD) were importing fewer high-tech goods from the Comecon 
states because developing countries had become more competitive.41 
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Nevertheless, a tendency (if only a slight one) to regard capitalist economies 
as crisis-racked remains evident in the reports to the very end. A report from 1983 on 
the EEC’s initiatives to overcome the economic recession of the early 1980s used 
terms--“in the light of the continuing capitalist world economic crisis,” “the most 
difficult economic crisis since the 1930s”--which will have encouraged the SED’s 
leaders to believe that the Western world was in profound crisis. The report 
maintained that, “According to opinions of committed European politicians, voiced 
internally, the EC mechanism is showing itself in fact to be completely powerless 
faced with the problems of unemployment, combating the deficits and restoring the 
competitiveness of Western European industry.” In short, it concealed the strength of 
the Western European economies.42 A report from 1983 on high-level politics in 
Bonn, clearly drawn from information obtained from excellent sources, maintains 
that, “The governing coalition’s economic policy, directed at the strengthening of 
monopoly capital, is also leading to considerably greater social burdens on the 
working masses than the previous SPD-led government’s policy.”43 
The Department’s reporting had strengths. It received very good intelligence 
from West Germany and recognized its value. Its reporting improved between the 
1950s and 1980s. It was always very matter-of-fact in character. The reports from the 
1970s on were good reports: though they contained some ideological language and 
concepts, they were overwhelmingly factual and true to the sources. The reporters 
claim that the HVA leadership expected them to put ideology to one side and report 
matter-of-factly; they largely achieved this.44 They tried to draw on all the available 
information, not just one source. Very often the Department merely summarized the 
contents of a West German report on a particular topic. Or it set out its sources’ 
accounts of meetings they had attended. In both cases, it made much use of reported 
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speech and in these cases its reports are particularly factual in character. The German 
language uses the present subjunctive to indicate reported speech; the Department’s 
reports abound in its use. The reports’ tendency to summarize information obtained in 
the West, rather reach conclusions itself, was so great that, as the GDR’s Foreign 
Trade Minister in the 1980s, Gerhard Beil, rightly pointed out, they must have 
resembled those of West Germany’s Federal Intelligence Service, 
(Bundesnachrichtendienst, BND) itself. Indeed, the better the HVA became, the more 
its reports resembled those of its adversary.45 
The reporters were not afraid to pass on facts which the Party leadership will 
not have liked. Indeed, they consistently did so.46 The best examples are their reports 
on NATO’s military planning, which consistently made clear that NATO expected to 
respond to an attack by the Warsaw Pact. This flatly contradicted the Party line that 
the West was the threat to peace, yet the HVA did not distort its account of NATO’s 
assumption and planning; it did not present NATO as more aggressive than it was.47 
The HVA was just as matter-of-fact in its reporting on political matters. The West 
German politicians and civil servants who were its main targets had a very low 
opinion of the GDR. So did foreigners around the world. While the reporters toned 
down criticism, it still shines through the reports. Willy Brandt was quoted in a 1959 
report telling his party chairman, Erich Ollenhauer, that he did not trust the USSR and 
considered it extremely dangerous and aggressive, to the point of being capable of 
going to war.48 A report on Brandt a little later implicitly concedes that his anti-
Communism increased his popularity in West Berlin.49A report from 1961 relates that 
Indian officials were not in the least supportive of the GDR’s position on West 
Berlin.50  
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A report from 1972 makes clear that the West German government, then 
negotiating a recognition treaty with the GDR (the Grundlagenvertrag51), thought the 
trade between the two German states insignificant for the Federal Republic, though 
valuable for the GDR. The readers can have been left in no doubt as to the West 
German view of the small size of the GDR’s economy as compared with theirs.52 A 
report from the same month, June 1972, demonstrates that the French government 
thought little of Comecon and its chances of successfully integrating the economies of 
the Bloc states.53 Another report from 1972, on Egyptian President Anwar Sadat’s 
visit to Moscow, was not afraid to present the visit in a way unfavorable to the Soviet 
Union and thus unwelcome to the GDR. Sadat’s visit was declared to be a failure; he 
had not obtained the support he sought. Consequently, he only had one option: to 
improve Egypt’s relations with the United States. This was a success for President 
Nixon, who had seen that time was on his side in the USA’s relations with Egypt. The 
information was obtained from sources close to Sadat’s Vice-President, Dr Fawzy.54  
During Erich Honecker’s leadership (1971-89), the members of the SED 
Politburo regularly received much information that was equally critical of the GDR in 
the monthly reports on West German media broadcasts about East Germany of the 
latter’s Institute for International Politics and Economics (Institut für Internationale 
Politik und Wirtschaft). These reports made clear how little the West German media 
thought of the legitimacy and stability of the SED regime.55 
A surprising aspect of the HVA’s archive is how much the SED relied on 
West German reports for information on Communist Rumania. A report from 1972 
does not hesitate to show Ceauşescu’s regime as brutally repressive (just like the 
SED’s own). In the report appears the striking phrase, “Party and government are of 
course endeavoring to monitor all signs of life on the part of the population and are 
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accordingly resisting all efforts at liberalization with iron resolution.”56 Amnesty 
International might have been proud of this phrase. Of course, the authors of the 
report could only write it because there was no love lost between the Communist 
regimes of East Germany and Rumania. 
Naturally, bad news abounds in the reports for 1989. As 1988 became 1989, 
the HVA was quick to obtain NATO Secretary-General Manfred Wörner’s end-of-
year report. It reported accurately Wörner’s view that the Communist systems of the 
USSR and Eastern Europe were falling apart: political pluralism was being introduced 
in the Soviet Union; Communist rule was collapsing in China; and Poland and 
Hungary were carrying out genuine political reforms.57 Prime Minister Stoph, 
Hermann Axen and others will not have enjoyed reading, in September 1989, a report, 
expressed very matter-of-factly, that NATO countries thought that the GDR would 
not follow other Bloc states in adopting reform, but would try to preserve its 
“inflexible command economies [sic].”58 Indeed, by that time not even that most 
small-minded of dogmatists, Erich Mielke, was insisting that the ideological pieties be 
observed. In October 1989, a report by the HVA to the party leadership about the 
agrarian economies of the Communist states went out over his signature. It 
summarized, again matter-of-factly, the West German view that the agrarian sectors 
of the Communist economies were in a worse state than any others.59  
Inevitably, the Department’s reporting was not entirely of facts. Facts needed 
to be interpreted for a sensible report to be prepared. This required judgements about 
their significance. Since the Department did not intend its reports to challenge the 
Party’s thinking, they are better called “sub-judgements.” A good example of such a 
judgement is provided by a report from January 1983 on political developments in 
Algeria. The report maintained that the Algerian leadership was increasingly 
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dominated by “petit bourgeois-nationalistically oriented forces” led by the President, 
Chadli Bendjedid. “Nationalist-religious circles” were also on the rise. Both were 
gaining ground at the expense of the Marxist Left, or “the revolutionary-democratic 
forces,” as the report called them. Consequently, the forces in the leadership were 
growing which wanted to encourage private business and open the economy to the 
West. This would include expanding economic relations with the United States, which 
would use them to exercise political influence. In short, the report made use of 
Marxist concepts about social class but took an empirical approach to reporting on 
political conditions in Algeria and made statements which were unwelcome from the 
GDR’s perspective.60  
This report was sent to the chairman of the State Planning Commission, 
Gerhard Schürer, who had just returned from a visit to Algeria. There he had 
discussed political developments with the Soviet ambassador, Vasili N. Rykov, who 
was also a member of the Soviet Communist Party’s Central Committee. Rykov’s 
view had been different from that of the HVA. As he saw it, Algeria’s leadership, 
though it had been forced to make some compromises in respect of private business, 
was still committed to a Socialist course and opposed a pro-capitalist policy. In its 
foreign policy the regime still held to “fundamental anti-imperialistic positions.” 
Economic dependence on the USA was actually in decline.61  
Schürer did not know what to make of the differences between the two views 
and sent the note of his conversation with Rykov to Mielke.62 Mielke asked 
Department VII to consider the note and comment. The Department defended its 
report, arguing that Rykov’s view was too simple and too much his own; it focused 
too much on how the Algerian leadership described themselves, rather than on 
intelligence on what it was actually doing. Intelligence received established that 
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“progressive” forces were actually being repressed; conservative and reactionary 
forces were playing significant roles in the leadership and government bureaucracy. 
There were policy discussions in the leadership about initiatives which were clearly 
not socialist. Reforms in the private sector of the economy were not mere concessions 
to internal and external pressure; they reflected a declining commitment to Socialism. 
While Rykov maintained that Algeria’s foreign policy remained anti-imperialist, the 
facts suggested that nationalism and pragmatism were playing a larger role in 
determining policy and that greater efforts were being made to expand economic 
relations with the West. Algeria was increasingly seeking to maintain a neutral 
position as between the superpowers and was pressing for such a policy within the 
Non-Aligned Movement.63 
Even at the end of the regime, though, reports suppressed truths of which the 
authors were aware. In October 1989, the HVA reported to Honecker, Stoph, Axen, 
Krenz and other party leaders about the Chinese Communist Party’s view of the 
drastic turn of events in the Soviet Bloc. The report was signed by Mielke (as were 
other reports at this time) and he clearly played a role in its drafting. Much of what 
the Chinese were reported to have said--that Hungary seemed to be adopting a 
Western political system and that Communism could be overthrown throughout 
Eastern Europe--is clearly an accurate report. So is the report of the Chinese view of 
the flood of migrants from the GDR to the Federal Republic. Mielke quoted the 
Chinese as saying that in every country there were people who, for personal reasons, 
wanted to emigrate. The Federal Republic was certainly deliberately increasing this 
dissatisfaction, “but,” the Chinese were reported to have said very delicately, “there 
had to be some other reasons for the desire of GDR citizens to leave.” Mielke was 
glossing over the truth, knowing full well that the crisis went deeper. Indeed, the 
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remark he made next points to this awareness. He wrote that, “One could therefore 
say that identification with the currently existing form of Socialism in the GDR was 
lacking among many citizens.”64 He was deliberately deferring to Honecker’s wishful 
thinking about the emigration crisis. Asked by a Swedish newspaper in 1984 why so 
many people wanted to leave the GDR, Honecker had replied that in every country 
there were people who thought that they would do better elsewhere. He added that 
every year some 53,000 to 60,000 West Germans chose to leave the Federal Republic. 
In short, he used information he received to support his distorted view of reality, not 
to rethink it.65 
 
˂A˃Acceptance of intelligence 
Every indication is that the SED leadership had a severely distorted view of political 
developments. A dictatorship has the power to cut itself off from reality. So it was 
with the GDR’s gerontocracy in the 1980s. The HVA’s last chief, Werner Großmann, 
maintains that the leadership was very sceptical of his service’s intelligence reports.66 
The reports on political and economic affairs evidently made little impression on their 
readers. Honecker’s attitude towards the emigration crisis has been mentioned above. 
The most cherished delusion of all Communist regimes was that dissent was stirred up 
from outside. Honecker took this so far that in the 1980s he insisted that the HVA find 
out the BND registration number of the prominent dissident, Bärbel Bohley.67  
The HVA’s reports probably made little impact on Honecker. They will have 
been damned by the fact that they repeated too much information which was sent to 
him in surveys of the Western media. This information he rejected as false and 
malicious propaganda. He will have been no more inclined to believe intelligence 
reports on the outside world. Interviewed after the regime fell, he said that he had paid 
Copyright 2015 by Georgetown University Press. Maddrell, P. The Image of the Enemy: Intelligence 
Analysis of Adversaries since 1945. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press
138 
 
little attention to ZAIG reports on the GDR’s domestic situation because they 
contained the same criticisms as the Western press. Foreign intelligence reports had 
the same flaw. All Honecker could tolerate was information he wanted to read. The 
analogy with the Western press applies very well to the HVA’s reports: they were 
similar to newspapers and were based on sources in the West. Honecker was, in 
substance, reading a classified Western newspaper. Honecker expressed a higher 
opinion of information he received from the Socialist Unity Party and its Arbeiter- 
und Bauern Inspektion (Workers’ and Peasants’ Inspectorate). The latter were full of 
factual information on the problems of everyday life in the GDR, such as the 
availability of consumer goods, their poor quality and so on.68 This was Honecker’s 
great interest; he wanted to be seen as a man who had given East Germans a good 
standard of living. 
Nevertheless, he was swayed by some foreign intelligence. Intelligence 
obtained from Günter Guillaume on Willy Brandt’s Eastern policy succeeded in 
overcoming Honecker’s strong, ideologically-influenced hostility to better relations 
with West Germany. Dogmatic Marxist-Leninist that he was, Honecker initially 
regarded Brandt’s policy as hostile and reflective of a capitalist crisis in the Federal 
Republic; he was persuaded by the HVA’s intelligence that a measure of beneficial 
cooperation could be achieved.69 Late in the Cold War, he was also encouraged to 
support Gorbachev’s first moves towards arms reduction in Europe by intelligence 
that the West German government did not think that high-tech conventional weapons 
would enable NATO to achieve any military superiority over the Warsaw Pact.70 
The principal recipient of Department VII’s reports on foreign political and 
economic matters in the 1970s and 1980s was, not the SED General Secretary, but 
Hermann Axen. This was natural since, as the Central Committee Secretary for 
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International Relations, he held the highest foreign policy job in the GDR and played 
a large role in shaping the GDR’s foreign policy. He was just as much as true believer 
in Marxism-Leninism as Honecker. His comment to the Soviet leadership, in 1984, 
“that we have a stronger influence on the FRG than it has on us,” is proof of how 
deluded he was (at the time, more and more East Germans were applying to emigrate 
to the Federal Republic and the availability of the West German Deutsche Mark in the 
GDR was encouraging intense demand for Western consumer goods).71 At the very 
same time, the HVA accurately reported that the influence of the peace movement in 
Western Europe was declining. Axen said that the report was wrong and sent it 
back.72 Just how doctrinaire the SED’s leaders were is demonstrated by the fact that 
their intelligence reports presented them with much Western information on the 
weaknesses of the Soviet Union’s economy, but they still obdurately opposed 
reform.73 They probably pounced on information which accorded with their own 
views, such as that mass unemployment was a terrible problem in West Germany74, or 
that the peace movement was on the rise there75. 
 
˂A˃Conclusion: reporters, not analysts 
Department VII’s officers had a difficult job: that of reporting on what they knew to 
be good intelligence to people who were hostile to much of it. They took a middle 
course between challenging the leaders’ thinking and distorting intelligence so that it 
reflected that thinking. The result was factual reporting, expressed in politically 
correct language and using politically correct concepts, which was meant to challenge 
the Party’s thinking as little as possible. This was neither independent thinking nor 
intelligence to please. It lay halfway in between: it was intelligence meant to displease 
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as little as possible. However, the reports still did displease; the pill could not be 
entirely sugared. When they displeased, they were simply ignored or rejected. 
The reports were too tame. Although they did not, for the most part, 
consciously provide information which reinforced the leaders’ misconceptions, they 
did not try hard enough to challenge or eliminate them. The party leaders were men 
who deluded themselves; the Hauptverwaltung Aufklärung allowed them to do so. 
The HVA was a good foreign intelligence service. It consistently supplied the top 
leaders with intelligence relevant to their policy initiatives and concerns. It did not 
seek to persuade the Party because the latter did not want it to. It therefore passed on 
the facts of information received from its sources, introducing its own interpretation 
as little as possible. Its factual reporting was thorough and good. Among the facts 
were plenty which should have caused Axen, Honecker, Ulbricht and their colleagues 
to rethink their assumptions. They were never minded to do so.  
The HVA itself had no view of the Federal Republic different from that of the 
SED leadership. That view was the official GDR view: the Federal Republic was a 
successor state to the Third Reich, a capitalist state which, under the leadership of 
American capitalism, threatened the world again with war. As a capitalist economy, it 
was exploitative and so had a natural tendency towards crisis.  
Department VII’s staff were reporters, not analysts. Analysis in the American 
sense--independent thinking--was precisely what the HVA was not allowed to do. 
Least of all was it allowed to consider major problems such as are examined in US 
National Intelligence Estimates. On the available evidence it was never told to pose 
itself the questions: “why is the West German economy such a success?,” or “how 
will the strength of the Federal Republic’s economy affect the interests of the GDR 
over the next ten years?.” There are no such reports among those which survive. 
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Instead, it was told to snoop around in the West German Economics and Finance 
Ministries and the Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie and report on what the 
officials there were saying and planning. Their reports are remarkably free of any 
direct discussion of West Germany’s economic strength. They are very much current 
intelligence; they do not look deeper than what was being said or planned at that time. 
They avoid the major issues; these had already been decided by the principles of 
Marxism-Leninism.  
Indeed, the hardest subjects for Department VII’s officers to report on were 
economic. Its understanding of economics is the most obviously flawed part of 
Marxism. Neither the reporters nor their political leaders understood or wanted to 
understand how the West German or international economies worked. Nor did they 
seek new answers to the big economic questions. Instead, Department VII described 
economic plans and discussions and provided lists of statistics. Their Marxist training 
still influenced their economic reporting, though, and for the worse. Fact and 
interpretation could not be entirely separated here. The reports for the 1970s and 
1980s are better than the earlier ones because the Department had learned to discuss 
economic and financial matters very factually; their reports read like minutes of the 
meetings concerned.  
The easiest subjects to report on were military and scientific. They raised no 
political issue. Military intelligence reports were long and useful to consumers. 
Department VII also reported on people in a very particular way. The 
Communist Party had a very special status in every Communist state. The HVA had 
to be careful in the way it presented Communist leaders because they dominated and 
represented their parties. By contrast, Willy Brandt, Helmut Schmidt, Konrad 
Adenauer and other West German politicians, ministers, civil servants, businessmen 
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and media figures appear as ordinary people in the reports because they are presented 
very matter-of-factly. Department VII’s officers certainly had a far better 
understanding of them than they did of the distant and narrow-minded ideologues 
who abused and disregarded their reports. So much political intelligence did the HVA 
collect on the Federal Republic that the reader often has the sense that its staff felt 
more at home in the corridors of the Bundestag and Foreign Office than they would 
have been in those of the SED Central Committee or the GDR’s Parliament, the 
Volkskammer.  
The HVA was, actually, freer in its reporting on West Germany than it or 
other departments of the Stasi were in their reporting on the GDR.76 It could and did 
say that West German trades unionists had voted for conservative parties. It would 
have been impossible to say that East German industrial workers favored “bourgeois” 
policies and parties. It was made even easier in West German case because it would 
be presented in a straightforwardly factual report; Department VII was not claiming 
that this was its own finding. By contrast, the HVA officers knew that they could not 
dispute that their regime had the support of its own working class.  
The SED leaders’ attitude towards foreign intelligence can be seen in these 
reports. Walter Ulbricht was interested in it. He received a lot of it in the late 1950s 
and early 1960s. However, he was a true believer in Marxism-Leninism and an utter 
dogmatist. Intelligence had to say the right thing. Honecker was much less interested 
in it. His main concern was to give East Germans a better standard of living and thus 
show them that they lived in a truly Socialist society. Though sensitive to what the 
Western media were saying about the GDR, he was, in the view of some of his 
Politburo colleagues, even less able than Ulbricht to tolerate criticism of the state of 
affairs there.77 Hermann Axen received much more foreign political intelligence than 
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Honecker or any other Politburo member did. He was also a dogmatist who clearly 
regarded the sole function of intelligence as giving the Party opportunities for action it 
wanted to take. He did not see its role as being to persuade the leadership to take a 
view different from that it wanted to. A constant of Communism is the leaders’ 
criticism of their intelligence services and rejection of their intelligence.  
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